Words Matter

The recent debate within the Bush administration about whether we are in a war on terrorism or a global struggle against violent extremism is important for understanding the struggle over means and ends in foreign policy in the aftermath of the 911. How much military capability do you need? With military capability at hand, what strategic goal does the military serve?  Is military power the solution to every problem? The consensus in the foreign policy establishment is that the United States has a special role to play in the world.  Democratization is one important goal, and in the 1990’s we learned that goal depends on our military.  In the decade after the end of the Cold War, Presidents G.W. Bush and Clinton did not significantly cut back our military forces as was the American tradition when victory was achieved. Consequently, the United States in the post Cold War world was not only the sole superpower but militarily positioned to act depending on the dominant forces within the administration. But the military, as a consequence of its experience in the Vietnam War, was not always ready to play their part without guarantees of political support and an exit strategy.  During the Balkan crisis, for example, Secretary of State Madeline Albright confronted a reluctant General Colin Powell with this question: why do we maintain the splendid military force if it couldn’t be used for humanitarian goals. Chalmers Johnson argues that by not reorganizing the military and cutting back on its costs what remained and continued to grow was an “Empire of Bases” which poses a long term threat to democracy and to the long term interests of the country; see the Conversations with History interview with Chalmers Johnson at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/CJohnson/cjohnson-con0.html .  Andrew Bacevich sees a militarization of American society and culture; See the Conversations with History interview with Andrew Bacevich http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Bacevich/bacevich-con0.html. During the Clinton administration, in the struggle over goals and capability, the dominant force in foreign policy became those groups advocating humanitarian intervention. See the Conversations with History interview with David Rief http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Rieff/rieff-con0.html. In my Conversations with History interview with former Bush speech writer David Frum, he emphasized the importance of Bush’s definition of the post 911 challenge as requiring a war on terrorism.  http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Frum/frum-con0.html The problem of terrorism would require a military solution, and using the military would allow the President at his discretion to transcend the barriers that prevented decisive action at home and abroad. This was the Bush answer to the means and ends question in foreign policy. The answer was decisively influenced by the alliance of administration nationalists and neoconservatives. This rationale provided a statement of mission under which the President could rally the people and the military according to his choosing. On the ascendancy of the neoconservatives, see the Conversations with History interview with Jonathan Clarke http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Clarke/clarke-con0.html.  On the views of the nationalists, see the Conversations with History interview with James Mann. http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/JMann/jmann-con0.html The problem of means and ends in foreign policy was not solved, and history tells us why.   In a Conversations with History interview, UCLA historian/sociologist Michael Mann described how such terminology, which may in the short term resolve the domestic debate, goes against the lessons of history because it confuses terrorism as a global, transnational force with national liberation movements that use terrorism as a tactic to succeed at the national level. http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Mann/mann-con0.html  So the language “War on Terrorism” does not help policymakers decide when and where to intervene.  A broad goal such as “War on Terrorism” by ignoring the local reality has the potential to confuse important strategic questions about where and when to intervene.  What is perceived as a battle in the fight against global transnational terrorism may only be a about nationalism and national liberation.  To confuse the two is an invitation to enter a quagmire which will only undermine the military capability of the global superpower. Thus, the “War on Terrorism” when applied to Iraq confronts nationalism, tribalism, and the traditional nature of Iraqi society.  What is efficient for United States domestic policy decisively settling for the short term the debate about ends and means becomes bad foreign policy, and a botched intervention is the likely outcome.