Conversations with History Blog

Political Leadership and Obama's State of the Union

With his eye set on the next election, President Obama attempted to remind the country and the Congress that sacrifice for the common good is a pressing need.   As preacher-in-chief, he tried to summon the best within our national character to meet the great tasks before us.  He embraced many liberal goals:  more teachers, more roads, and more innovative technology.  However, despite the impressive rhetoric, in tackling the domestic and international agendas, Obama, two years into his term, has come up wanting.  He seems to be always negotiating half-heartedly, indifferently, and fearfully. In short, when Obama comes to the bargaining table, he is so focused on facilitating compromise and restoring civility that he prematurely abandons the very principles he espouses. However, political life requires making the good fight with tenacious commitment to principle and pursuit of hard bargaining.  Compromise comes only after political struggle. Unfortunately, Obama, for reasons of inexperience or character, is not willing, when push comes to shove,  to confront power and entrenched interests in either domestic or international politics.           

In last night’s State of the Union message, Obama’s call to sacrifice  was framed in terms of “competitiveness,” not in terms of restoring equality to the American landscape.   We are asked to focus on our competition with the Chinese in order to sell them more products.  Restoring the quality of life to our fellow citizens who are unemployed, who have lost their homes and retirement savings, is a second order priority.  

The President also gave in to the Republican framing of the issues:  the emphasis was on deficit reduction, government efficiency, and reduction of public expenditures.  With this agenda, America will be saved by the American spirit and character.  This begs the question of who will pay for the country’s new investments for the future.

The speech made only passing reference to international affairs. Obama is not incapable of negotiating as the new Salt Treaty and the Sudan settlement show.  But in international affairs, Obama seems to be operating on the principle that ambiguity and civility will produce results.  In resolving the Afghan/Pakistan conflict, he remains committed to a long war and to a short war. In the Middle East, he remains committed to freezing Israeli settlements and to deferring to Netanyahu’s political vision. In fighting the war on terror, he remains committed to Bush’s “War on Terrorism” but under a different banner and without a muscular commitment to civil liberties and international law.

Last night’s State of the Union suggests that President Obama can be both inspirational and insightful. Whether he can achieve concrete results in the fighting ring of politics, defined by the intransigence of Republican or foreign leaders, is another matter.

Obama versus McChrystal: Winning the battle but losing the politics of war

In ousting General Stanley McChrystal, Obama conjured up images of President Harry Truman firing General Douglas MacArthur. This comparison is misleading because the Truman-MacArthur conflict was over substance. Though Obama was justified in firing McChrystal for showing poor judgment in bad-mouthing his civilian partners in the military led counterinsurgency strategy, McChrystal must have been frustrated by the contradictions in policy at the heart of what is now Obama’s war:  limiting collateral damage while winning hearts and minds, building government institutions with a corrupt partner while defeating an insurgency; adding more troops but never enough; and building up in order to leave. The elephant in the General’s command post was not the Rolling Stone reporter but a stark reality:  Afghanistan is the wrong war, in the wrong place at the worst possible time.

So a better comparison than with Truman’s decisiveness is with President Lyndon B. Johnson’s disastrous incremental decision making in the Vietnam War.  In analyzing the Pentagon papers, Daniel Ellsberg made an important point about that conflict:  President Johnson and his predecessors knew they couldn’t win militarily but they knew also that if they didn’t continue the escalation, they would lose politically.  What political factors account for Obama’s journey down a comparable slippery slope?

• Electoral Politics:  Obama’s decisions about the war go back to his Presidential campaign. At that time, to win the election he needed to win the support of the peace faction in his own party and, at the same time, not be perceived as a peacenik by the right of center.  He committed himself to ending “the bad war in Iraq” in order to pursue “the good war in Afghanistan.”  In this way, he could (a) politically distance himself from the disastrous policies of Cheney/Rumsfeld in Iraq, (b) highlight the failure of Bush to capture Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and (c) embrace the left and its critique of America’s Iraq policy.

• Early Decisions:  Shortly after his election, in a pattern reminiscent of LBJ after the assassination of JFK, Obama made several decisions that escalated the conflict. Obama doubled down on the Afghanistan policy, firing the allied commander in Afghanistan and bringing on board McChrystal who had been the leader of special ops in Iraq — assassination squads that were the third pillar of the apparently successful surge in Iraq.  McChrystal had also been implicated in the cover-up of the friendly fire killing of Pat Tillman in Afghanistan. Obama also agreed to bring the troop level up to 100,000 giving McChrystal 30,000 of the 40,000 troops he requested.  Obama also committed the U.S. to a July, 2011 withdrawal date.  At work was Obama’s now apparent political style of rationalizing and synthesizing the prevailing views of important centers of power in an issue area.  In this case, that meant splitting the difference among his advisors: He would build up in order to get out.

• The New General:  In choosing General David Petraeus to replace McChrystal as the new allied commander in Afghanistan, Obama has created an ever more powerful constraint on future options.  As the hero of Iraq, Petreaus is uniquely positioned politically to get what he wants in terms of troops, resources, and timetable.  Petreaus has already made clear that Obama’s deadline for withdrawal is “condition based.”  If Petreaus wants more troops, he will get them. If he doesn’t, he won’t be fired; he will quit. He can then come home and run for President as a Republican.

• The doctrine: The  counterinsurgency doctrine being implemented in Afghanistan and authored by Petreauus is a plan of action for U.S. forces as they fight terrorism in failed states. The doctrine resonates with that part of the foreign policy elite that seeks a rationale for American intervention to achieve global stability. Counterinsurgency reconciles the Wilsonian vision of bringing democracy to far away places with the reality of U.S. military power by turning soldiers into nation builders. In the 1990’s the human rights community learned that to bring American ideals to places like the Balkans, outside actors had to build governmental institutions,  train security forces, and transform society to make human rights  a reality.  This renewed commitment to a Wilsonian vision for America’s role in the world coincided with the military’s need for a new mission in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the defeat of communism.   After 911, terrorism replaced communism as the U.S enemy. When the Bush administration went to war in Iraq because of weapons of mass destruction and then found none, it pivoted from its original rationale with one more politically acceptable — bringing democracy to Iraq.  It moved to state/nation building in spite of Bush’s campaign rhetoric not to do so.  In the insulated foreign policy community, Petraeus and the counterinsurgency doctrine represent the most broadly acceptable rationale for the military and its $700 billion budget in a world that lacks a superpower rival to the United States. State building by soldiers is an ideal fit with the relative budgets of the State Department and the Pentagon. ($700 billion versus $50 billion).  Ironically, because of the nature of Afghanistan’s traditional tribal society and the vested interest of regional actors in continuing the conflict, the Petreaus doctrine is being tested in the worst place imaginable.

• The regional players:  Finally, Obama is vulnerable because a political solution depends on regional actors — Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran and China — who have clients in the Afghan struggle, have no incentive to extricate the U.S. from its new quagmire, and no reason to make the U.S. leader in the settlement process.  The Petreaus doctrine increases the possibility that regional actors such as Pakistan will reach a deal with the Afghan government and the Taliban over the head of the United States. Pakistan feels it must dictate the terms of a post U.S. withdrawal settlement in order to continue its policy of achieving “strategic depth” in its conflict with India by using Afghanistan as a base of Kashmir insurgents. As America proceeds down the path of counterinsurgency to achieve a position of strength in order to facilitate  negotiations later for a settlement in Afghanistan, regional actors have an interest in consolidating their position in the face of American ambiguity about when and if it is leaving Afghanistan.  Committed to getting out by July 2011, Obama has selected a commander who has the political capital to stand against that goal adding further to the chaos and confusion that is Afghanistan.

The few days that transpired from the publication of the Rolling Stone article to the replacement of one general with another was a fine display of Presidential power in defense of civilian control of the military. Unfortunately, the political factors — the promises of the campaign, the early decisions, the appointment of Petreaus, the prevailing counterinsurgency doctrine, and the aims and goals of regional actors — all suggest that the clock is ticking and Obama’s choices with regard to Afghanistan are limiting the possibilities for what he might really want to do in that part of the world. His dilemma is not unlike that of the Presidents who took the long road to Vietnam.

Reflections on The Conversations with History Story

 

reprinted from UCTV blog http://www.uctv.tv/uctvblog/

 

Harry Kreisler Reflects on 28 Years of "Conversations with History"

>> Wednesday, April 28, 2010

We're proud of UCTV's ten years, but we've got nothing on Harry Kreisler, host of "Conversations with History." Harry's conducted 485 interviews over the series' 28 years of production on the UC Berkeley campus, and he's recently released a book featuring some of his most fascinating interviews.

The series is extremely popular with UCTV viewers, so we thought it was time to turn the tables and ask him a few questions.

How did "Conversations with History" (CWH) first come about?

As executive director of the Institute of International Studies, I hosted a luncheon seminar on the nuclear arms race for Berkeley faculty in the early 1980s. In attendance were four Nobel laureates, a former U.S. ambassador to the Comprehensive Test Ban talks, and many other distinguished scientists and social scientists. The discussion was lively and more informed than anything I had seen or heard in media on a very important issue. I felt frustrated that, as a public university, we were not making this conversation available to the public. So I worked with campus media services to develop an interview format for the many distinguished visitors that come to the UC Berkeley campus. We taped the first interview on April 5, 1982 with Manfred Lahnstein, a senior advisor to the Chancellor of West Germany, and began sharing the tapes with local cable access channels across the state. When UCTV went on the air in 2000, we expanded our audience nationally and, a few years later, globally via the web.

What are some of your most memorable interview moments?

I spend a great deal of time preparing for interviews and learning about each guest. For many guests, my familiarity with their work makes them more comfortable and creates a more natural and informative conversation. A good example is my interview with Oliver Stone. At first he was guarded and distracted, but once he realized I was prepared and had watched all of his movies, his demeanor changed and I was able to zero in on the impact his service in the Vietnam War had on his art.

I interviewed Elizabeth Warren a year or two before the financial collapse. A Harvard Law professor, she had been working on the economic distress of the middle class. I was terribly impressed with her insights and with her background; she is the daughter of parents who experienced the Great Depression first hand in Oklahoma. When the financial crisis hit, she became an important figure in the fight against the practices of the banks and credit cards companies and was named chairperson of the Congressional commission to investigate the bank bail out.

In 2008 I interviewed Allan Hamilton, former chairman of the Surgery Department of the University of Arizona Medical School. He wrote a book on how science often couldn’t explain the recovery of his patients. In the course of preparing for the interview, I noted that, as an undergraduate, he had taken a writing course with Rod Serling of "The Twilight Zone." Many of the stories in his book were almost mystical and dealt with the supernatural. When I asked him if that undergraduate course had made him sensitive to these issues. he was taken aback because he had never made the connection in his own mind. Immediately after the interview, he called his wife to tell her about the insight into his intellectual odyssey—a connection that that hadn't been in his consciousness while writing the book.

Kenzaburo Oe is a Japanese Nobel Laureate in Literature I interviewed in 2000. His major novel draws on his experience with the birth of his brain damaged son. In preparing for the interview, I realized that he had been heavily influenced by a visit to Hiroshima around the time of his child’s birth. The discussion of this connection in the interview provoked an unbelievably moving account of his decision about the survival of his son and his son's emergence as an outstanding composer.

In 2007 I interviewed Kenneth Kaunda, one of the great leaders of the African liberation struggle and the first black President of Zambia. We traced the influence of religion on his rise as a political and national leader and I was really taken by his concern for his own people, but also humanity in general. His description of how his love of God made him a better political leader was quite moving and came from the heart.

Daniel Ellsberg is a hero for the 1960s generation. In our 1998 conversation, we discussed in detail his decision to leak the Pentagon papers, an extraordinary heroic act that set in motion a series of events that brought down President Nixon. I was terribly impressed with how our dialogue captured the essence of his story: rigorous analysis of the constraints on presidents as as they waged the Vietnam War, together with a moving appreciation for the human drama of a conscientious objector he had met whose example of resistance led Ellsberg to make the decision to give up his career as one of the President’s men and take the path of Resistance, thereby changing the course of American history.

CWH was one of the first programs to air on UCTV and, over the past decade, it has become our most popular series. What’s changed for you since you’ve “gone global?”

When I travel in the state, in other parts of the U.S. or globally (China or Europe, for example), I run into people who know the program and watch me regularly on YouTube or via podcast, and I get fan letters from all over the globe. UCTV has done an unbelievable job of expanding to new platforms as new technologies have emerged. It is really mind boggling to be appreciated both locally and globally.

My guests also feel the effect. In 1998 I interviewed the world renowned jurist, Albie Sachs, Associate Justice of the South African Constitutional Court and a heroic fighter against apartheid. He travels all over the world and, months after the interview, he wrote to tell me how his audiences were asking surprisingly poignant questions about his life and work. When he would ask them about how they knew so much, they would invariably respond, “Oh, we saw the Conversations with History interview!”

Tell us about your new book, "Conversations with History: Political Awakenings."

I collected 20 of the most fascinating interviews from the archive. My editor suggested the title “Political Awakenings” and I ran with that idea. As I played with the concept, I realized that the interviewees stand out because they came to see their world in a radically different way, with important implications for The World. They embraced ideas and actions that implied an alternative way of perceiving politics. In this context, politics means more than party affiliation; it refers to an understanding of power relations. They applied these insights in a variety of arenas, whether world affairs, the role of women in society, the impact on the environment of human behavior. In their own lives, the insights of these guests didn’t just happen but were the consequences of life experiences that helped clarify the way things held together—moments of political awakening.

Invariably, because of the interface between past and present, because of the limits and opportunities of their profession, or because of the interaction of different worlds, my guests were positioned to imagine alternatives to the conventional wisdom. A new way of seeing emerged in their thinking, in their writing, in their activism; with courage, perseverance, and determination, they took their ideas to a broader audience. In so doing, their world and the Politics of their World were changed forever.

The interviewees in the collection are: Tariq Ali (2003), Noam Chomsky (2002), Ron Dellums (2000), Oronto Douglas (2003), Shirin Ebadi (2006), Daniel Ellsberg (1998), Roya Hakakian (2009), Eva Harris (2001), Amira Hass (2003), Chalmers Johnson (2007), Jane Mayer (2008), Kenzaburo Oe (2000), Michael Pollan (2008), Ahmed Rashid (2002), Albie Sachs (1998), Philippe Sands (2008), Oliver Stone (1997), Joan Wallach Scott (2009), Elizabeth Warren (2007), and Howard Zinn (2001).

("Conversations with History: Political Awakenings" is available for purchase on Amazon.com)

What have you learned from your 28 years of interviewing the smartest individuals in the world?

I've learned the importance of seeing problems from diverse perspectives, especially thinking beyond the confines of nationality in order to appreciate the responsibilities of being a citizen with a global perspective. I have also learned how to appreciate the human condition, that tragedy and evil do exist in the world. Nonetheless, individuals can make a difference through perseverance, hard work, and creative thinking. They can change the world. Oh yes, I have also learned how important luck is in all our lives.

Book Signing in Berkeley, California on April 29th for Political Awakenings: Conversations with History

 

Book Signing in Berkeley, California on March 24th for Political Awakenings: Conversations with History

 

Moving images: War, Dissent, and Empathy

War movies fascinate because they reveal the dark side of our humanity.  The most powerful war movies are a tribute to the director’s focus on several important questions.  What is the nature of the war being fought?   Why do we fight? What are the consequences for the soldiers and the society they represent? In answering these questions, the greatest war movies transcend narrow patriotism and the visceral response to killing and slaughter. The directors are dissenters; they hold up a mirror to expose through the life of the combatant the folly of war.  The great war movies make us think and tell us who we are.

Here are 7 compelling examples and what their directors told us about war, dissent and empathy:

• Lewis Milestone’s All Quiet on the Western Front: No movie captures the disastrous consequences of trench warfare in World War I better than All Quiet, baring  the cost to humanity, the failure of patriotism, and the consequences for the dead and the living.
• Stanley Kubrick’s Paths of Glory: the political machinations that lead to needless slaughter in a battle in World War I.
• Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove: the absurdity of a Cold War where technology wedded to arms races propels civilization toward apocalypse.
• Gillo Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers: the moral consequences of a counterinsurgency that opposes national liberation in the name of a war against terrorism.
• Oliver Stone’s Platoon:  the moral consequences of the Vietnam War and its meaningless struggles for a piece of jungle that makes no sense in the context of a war without strategic merit.
• Ridley Scott’s Blackhawk Down: the heroism and bonding of soldiers caught in the unraveling of a ridiculous mission in Somalia.
• Kathryn Bigelow’s Hurt Locker:  the focus is  on how we fight an asymmetric conflict in Iraq and the consequences for a  risk taking soldier who thrives in the conflict.

None of these movies offers a compelling rationale for the war being fought. In fact, all are justifications for dissent. All presuppose the stupidity of the strategic and tactical goals at play. All point to the human consequences of war.  All find these truths by revealing the humanity of and consequences of the conflict for the soldier.  In the older movies by Kubrick and Milestone, the focus is also on those political leaders who are mendacious, power hungry, oblivious and uncaring about the consequences of their policies.

Interestingly, in the most recent films the anti-war sentiments of the director are buried in the narrative.  The strategic stupidity of the leaders is only addressed indirectly, if at all. The situation of the soldier becomes the key to revealing what war does to us. Moreover, soldiers can watch Platoon, Blackhawk Down, and Hurt Locker to relive their pain and thereby contribute to their healing process. But none of these recent films can justify the sacrifices made; they ignore why we fight  because the American establishment has embraced the role of empire and global gendarmes. (Only in a war film with avatars can the issue of empire be satisfactorily addressed!)  So the newer movies  make an important contribution by focusing on the way we fight. No longer are films manifestos of outraged anti-war sentiment.  Instead, empowered by the director’s moving images, we  feel and see  what happens in  the new kind of war.  We are also left to wonder what happens to the soldier when with shattered body and mind he returns home.

Here are two Conversations with History interviews relevant to understanding the experience of war and movie representation in film of that experience.

In the first interview director Oliver Stone talks about Vietnam, his movies, and the art of cinema.

In the second interview Nathaniel Fick, author of One Bullet Away, discusses his experiences in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Drawing on his wartime experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, Fick reflects on the nature of war and the role of the marines in post 911 conflicts. He focuses on military training and leadership with special attention to reconciling tactical and strategic imperatives, ethical issues in counterinsurgency missions, and deployment of military force as a complement to the full utilization of all aspects of American power.

The Presidency and the National Security State

Gary Wills is a historian, journalist, and public intellectual.  He has written many books on politics, religion, political philosophy, popular culture, and American history.  In his writings on political, religious, and cultural figures—men as diverse as St. Augustine, John Wayne, and Abraham Lincoln—Gary Wills has clarified our understanding of  leadership, the ideas that shape  their words and actions, and the subtle connections that bind them to their community and culture.  All of these writings are characterized by the depth and breadth of Gary Will’s intellectual reach, his meticulous research, and the startlingly original interpretations that shake up received wisdom and conventional interpretations.

Gary Wills has won a Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction for Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America (1993). He was awarded the National Medal for the Humanities in 1998. He has twice won the National Book Critics Award, including as a co winner for nonfiction in 1978 for Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. 

And in passing one should note that for his 1969 classic, Nixon Agonistes, The Crisis of the Self Made Man, he made President Nixon’s Enemy’s List.

 A professor of history emeritus at Northwestern University.  Wills is a frequent contributor to The New York Review of Books and other publications. A supporter of the candidacy of Barak Obama, he has recently criticized President Obama for his unexpected escalation of the war in Afghanistan. That escalation follows 8 years of  the Bush/ Cheney Presidency and its conduct of the  never ending War on Terrorism. These recent events are an appropriate time to reflect on what has brought us the present day--

to understand where we are and what we have become.  

In this new interview Conversations host Harry Kreisler welcomes historian Garry Wills for a discussion his new book, Bomb Power. Wills recalls the formative influences on his work as a writer including his Catholic faith and education; William Buckley and the editors of The National Review; the Vietnam War protests and the Civil Rights movement. Wills discusses the origins of one of his early books, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self Made Man. He explains the roots of his interest in leadership and reflects on other themes in his writing. Wills compares Barak Obama, Bill Clinton, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He explains why, after supporting the candidacy of Barak Obama, he has become a critic of the President. Wills then analyzes the impact of the atomic bomb on the U.S. constitutional system. After World War II, the national security intrusions on the Constitution were in the main not rescinded. The making of the atomic bomb and its subsequent maintenance and development set the pattern for consolidating a national security state characterized by an enlargement of Presidential power at the expense of other branches of government. Also there was a failure to restore constitutional safeguards. What followed was an increase in secrecy, waging of undeclared wars, decline of accountability, and an acceptance of the President as Commander in Chief. Wills concludes with an assessment of the possibilities for diminishing the national security state in the future.

Remembering Howard Zinn

Howard Zinn's legacy as an historian is extricably linked to his understanding of the importance of social movements and his commitment to activism.  In this interview recorded in 2001, he explains how his life's work led to these insights. Transcript at  http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Zinn/zinn-con0.html

Orhan Pamuk

 

 

Orhan Pamuk is the 2006 Nobel Laureate in Literature.  He is the author of many novels including The White Castle, The Black Book, The New Life, My Name is Red, Snow.  His works of non fiction include :Istanbul: Memories of a City‎ and  Other Colors: Essays and A Story.  His books have been translated into fifty languages. His new novel is The Museum of Innocence.

  

Orhan Pamuk honed his craft in one of the world’s great cities, Istanbul, and his embrace of that city and the “melancholy of its ruins” is a defining feature of the great artist he has become. He “ builds a new world with words” and draws you into that world. William Faulkner in his Nobel speech reminded us that it is only“the problems of the human heart in conflict with itself which make good writing.” Orhan Pamuk lives up to that tradition. His work is imbued with an extraordinary sensitivity to the pain and joy of the human condition.” A master of detail, he captures Istanbul society, especially  the foibles of a middle class that mindlessly mimics the West; he shows us  how men and women become prisoners of their passions and ambitions.

 

But in critiquing his own society, Orhan Pamuk does not reject its culture as he demonstrates in Istanbul: Memories of a City.  Torn between the allure of the West and the weight of tradition, Orhan Pamuk’s artistic journey has mastered and embraced the achievements of the West, its enlightenment, and its artistic forms such as the novel.  But he finds his authentic voice not by rejecting the traditions of Turkish culture but by interweaving its contributions with those of the West. In grappling with this tension, he has created some of the most important masterpieces of our time. As Pico Iyer writes in the New York Review of  Books,  “by drilling with such intensity and obsession into every corner of his own country's insecurities, Pamuk has given voice to nearly every society in the world torn between the longing to be global and to be itself.” 

 

But there is another reason why Pamuk speaks to an even broader international audience today.  As Nobel Laureaute Kenzaburo Oe reminded me in an interview, the great writers write from the periphery, write as the outsider in their own society, but also as an outsider in relation to the centers of world power and culture.  Today, the center of gravity is shifting; the periphery is becoming the center. The sun is rising in the East. We live in a time then where the West itself is facing decline. Just look around.  For that reason, Orhan Pamuk’s achievements will come to have even more meaning, especially for the West.

 

Orhan Pamuk writes “I sometimes think myself unlucky to have been born in an aging and impoverished city buried under the ashes of a ruined empire. But a voice inside me always insists this was really a piece of luck.” I would add, it is Our Luck, too.

The India Pakistan Conflict

As President Obama decides on a future course for Aghanistan policy, his administration would be wise to factor in the broader regional context. The first element of that equation is of course Pakistan. The failure of the Pakistani leadership to consolidate its national identity and to address the social and economic problems of its people lies at the heart of its failure to be a partner that the United States can count on in all dimensions of its security concerns.  For insight into Pakistan's failure to manage its own house see the Conversations with History interview with Tariq Ali

For an analysis of Pakistan's failure to help the United States in solving the Afghanistan problem after 911, see the Conversations with History interview with Ahmed Rashid

Finally, until the serious conflict between India and Pakistan is made part of a regional settlement, President Obama's increasing the number of US troops is unlikely to solve either the Afghanistan war or the deteriorating situation in Pakistan.  For a discussion of the India Pakistan conflict and the challenges posed by nuclear weapons, see the Conversations with History interview with T.V. Paul